Looking back on the mid-2010s always produces a sort of mirage effect in my mind. There was a feeling of newness and vigor that faintly bleeds through to the present, but at the same time, those memories now seem distant. I cannot deny the electricity that more or less enveloped the every happening associated with a growing cadre of online radicals that I bore witness to in the summer of 2015.
I recall the 8chan threads where anons translated Spanish texts about life under the Moors that had long since been forbidden from Anglophonic circulation. I remember everyone noticing that accounts on Twitter operating under pseudonyms were outflanking professional comedians, both in wit and in raw metrics. I remember how clearly one could see - for the first time - the battle lines being drawn by the Press, and the wealth of intelligent literature being produced in forceful reply by dedicated but mysterious writers in an underground network of dissident virtuosos. I remember DIY parody music and brilliant .png files for every occasion.
Then I remind myself that it is now 2022, and I look about Twitter for any trace of that incredible vitality. I am always mortified to find a sea of dimwitted, belligerent, soapbox preachers, pickup-artists, and snake oil merchants. What's worse - I find myself calculating that it has been like this for some time. 'I have to say something about this,’ I tell myself. But I could only ever manage a few spare sentences on the subject… Until now.
So how did things turn out like this? How did this happen?
Part I - Power Paralysis
There was much heated debate in the early days, and it covered very nearly every subject one could imagine - from nearly every perspective. It strikes me that there seemed to be ample camaraderie among interlocutors back then, even in the face of disagreements that routinely inspire rabid insults now. One subject that would reemerge time and again was that of power dynamics.
Even prior to Yarvin's rapid growth in notoriety within these circles, it was generally acknowledged that the academy and the majority of corporate America would seek to oppose the goals of the nascent Dissident Right and it's many subfactions. There were at least five major schools of thought to my reckoning - primitivist anarchists inspired by Ted Kaczsynski, ethnonationalist pagans, Traditionalist Catholics, and a kind of split between those of the latter who nurtured a fascination with writers like Moldbug himself, as well as techno-futurists of a more non-Theistic bent who shared these same reading habits.
All nonetheless agreed that the balance of power was shifted firmly out of their favor, and it was regarded as a likely outcome that even if the Executive Branch were to be found at all sympathetic, it would simply not prove enough to tip the scales. Discussions of social power, then - what it might be and how it could best be obtained - were a pivotal concern.
There were many theories that were discerned and discarded, but I can proffer a dangerously oversimplified recapitulation of some common threads of thought.
The political apparatus already in place was always mentioned but not regarded as a serious path to a solution, given that it had limited impact on the increasingly hyperactive courts, and it seemed to be subject to the influence of the Press and the Academy to a worrying degree, whereas it looked as though it affected them little in return. Likewise, a slow infiltration of major institutions appeared undesirable because those who had performed the long, slow march through all of them in the decades prior were actively ‘closing the doors behind themselves,’ and the requisite time for a forthcoming victory provided through such a glacial stratagem was far from guaranteed.
A general blueprint that always surfaced in one form or another involved making an appeal to any individuals entrenched within the structures of the so-called elite who may have been willing, for whatever reason, to break with their peers and provide the funding, organization, and promotion necessary to launch a battle for the heart and soul of the Nation. This presented an immediate paradox: in order to make such an appeal, there would need to be something like communications networks with which to reach the eyes and ears of any would-be benefactors, as well as goods and services with which to offer patronage and thereby barter for support. Of course, such things were exactly the kind of provenance of a movement that had already achieved the very successes then being sought.
Various proposals to resolve this difficulty were available, but a particular set of solutions overtook the consensus of the most popular accounts on Twitter. We shall hereon refer to this set of solutions - in full disregard for nuance - as 'optics.’
Pat II: The Case for Optics
The objective of the Optics strategy rested on a simple condition: in order to begin a cultural invasion and at the same time, affect policy changes, it would be necessary to make use of the GOP as a kind of vehicle for a new politics. This may seem innocuous enough, but one of the chief architects of the concept was insistent on something very particular that would have significant ramifications for the Dissident movement as it was at that time.
The person to whom I am referring is none other than Ricky Vaughan. Hailed as a major contributing force behind the unstoppable machine that was the online presence of the Trump phenomenon, and noted as a threat even by such publications as the Atlantic, Ricky was considered a leading figure in the burgeoning Twitter right-wing. His account(s) had been prolifically active since before even the days of GamerGate in late 2014, and many considered him a source of inspiration in their journey away from their previous left-leaning or apolitical stances.
Ricky maintained that in order to appropriate the GOP infrastructure, it would be necessary to implement three major strategies: 1) Maintain the appearance of class, composure, confidence, orderliness, and if at all possible, affluence; 2) Revert - in all public interactions - to the talking points and ideological trappings of the more familiar neoconservative, or ‘normiecon,’ variety; 3) Emphasize rhetoric in all correspondences of any kind, rather than dialectic.
Each of these flowed from a consideration that the average person lacked the thoughtfulness and analytical capacities necessary to assess arguments critically. Certainly, it was observed in discussions on Twitter, mypostingcareer, and the chans that the interlocutor with the least facts, the least descriptions, and logically invalid arguments could garner the most support if only they had more forceful rhetoric.
Though there were complex and convoluted trains of thought regarding the 'frames' of a debate and how these could be exploited, it was eventually noticed that contemporary Americans, in particular, were psychologically prone to sympathize with individuals they saw as confident - perhaps even boastful - as well as materially successful. Putting this observation together with the axiom that many in an audience could not parse arguments and decipher which of two would be the better, it stood to reason that the best possible way to make one's case to the American public was to project an image of triumph, largesse, and professionalism.
Coincidentally, these elements seemed to also synergize well with Republican party messaging, so much so that to accomplish one, would even be to accomplish the other. This was critical because in the mind of Ricky Vaughan and many of his contemporaries, the Dissident Right of the time lacked all of these qualities. This was viewed as a primary obstacle to launching the campaign to take over the Republican Party.
More must be said about the Republican party and its coveted political apparatus, however. Trump's own affiliation with the institution suggested that, in theory, desirable policy was viable within its corner of the American political landscape. Of course, in practice, there were many entrenched personalities with a visceral contempt for the 2016 GOP frontrunner and his supporters. This was all too obvious even in the summer of 2015, prior to the end of the Primaries. Ignorant and contemptuous commentators from CNN to Chapo Trap House routinely fail to note this divide.
There was another reason the party was so appealing from the standpoint of thought-leaders like Ricky. Struggles with funding were a constant thorn in the side of the Dissident movement - frustrating many of its ambitions, and it also did not escape attention that the average age of those involved with it skewed quite young, indeed. Many were twenty- and thirty-somethings, and quite a few were in their late teens. The relative wealth of Baby Boomers seemed to present a readily available solution to this problem.
This was precisely why Ricky was so adamant that the mask of neoconservatism be reassumed. Baby Boomers, especially, were prone to the irrational mechanisms of 'Optics' previously mentioned, and they were particularly enamored of things they found most familiar. Reverence for Reagan, Bush-era bravado, and 'small-government principles' appeared as the perfect rhetorical devices for wooing the Baby Boomer demographic, and opening its wallets.
Part III: Catastrophic Failure
Now that the considerations that formed the backbone of the 'Optics' rationale have been heretofore detailed, we must discuss their dramatic consequences. From the onset, Ricky set to work ruthlessly mocking anyone he saw as either challenging or rejecting his proposals, and it can't escape mention that he had a characteristic habit of refusing to explain himself, especially when there may have been a large number of onlookers. Much of what has been said thus far had to be hashed out in private Twitter conversations between this writer and the man, himself, and even then, there was much piecing together to be done.
Ricky's phrasing, style, and ideas were taken up by a number of other prominent figures in the Dissident Right, most notably the so-called 'Irony Bros,’ consisting loosely of Nick Fuentes, 'Prince Hubris,’ and Beardson Beardly, along with their adoring fanatics. These and others who found themselves impressed by Vaughan distinguished themselves from their detractors by brandishing the dreaded 'wignat' epithet. The wignats - it was said - represented dangerous excesses of ethno-nationalist sentiment, would alienate all 'normies' with their talking points, and may even contain federal assets attempting to incite violence for the purposes of entrapping unsuspecting young participants. Anyone unfortunate enough to be tarnished with the label 'wignat' was also thereby implied to be in association with the increasingly unpopular Richard Spencer and his TRS circle of cronies.
So it was that two factions emerged in a brewing internal power struggle among the Dissidents. The Optics camp waged an astonishingly successful war to capture the minds of the movement and antagonize their enemies - truthfully, anyone with even the most light-handed criticisms of them or their plans. By this point, Trump had already achieved an incredible upset victory over the Clinton campaign. Nearing the end of 2017, all of the convictions and language of the Optics contingent had been assumed by nearly every one of the most prominent commentators of Dissident Rightists on Twitter. It should also be reported that in time, Nick and many adjacent to him became increasingly vocal about their favor for Catholicism; such that the TradCath faction enjoyed growing eminence, although that is a subject for another time.
By the 2018 midterms, it was evident that the presidential victory two years before had not materialized into the runaway success for the Republicans that was being forecasted, even by Vaughan, himself. Moreover, the purveyors of the Optics approach had promised political victories, perhaps even a direct path to office in the world beyond for those formerly only influential in online spaces. This was decidedly absent, although there was a notable uproar surrounding one 'Paul Nehlen' and his attempt at a campaign, as well as its confusing relationship to major thought leaders on Twitter. This would also later result in a dire fiasco. Nonetheless, there remained great fervor and a loyal following for the Irony Bros and other Optics-oriented commentators, in spite of the failure to deliver substantive wins of any kind.
Nonetheless, problems were apparent from the beginning. For starters, the Press really did seem to have the final say on who or what constituted an 'extremist,’ and although it was said that one could somehow mitigate this by behaving in a manner that would impress the wary normy, it was far from obvious how this could be done, short of just completely conceding every point to one's opposition. This raised another problem.
Neoconservatism was scarcely less abhorrent than American Leftism. Many of the historic goals and planks of the 'Boomer conservative' were being fiercely denounced by even moderates within the Trump base. The hawkishness in foreign affairs, the obsession with tax cuts over all other aspects of domestic policy, and the connection to the growth of the Surveillance and Police State, were simply off-limits for principled young radicals of the Dissident Right - or even any ethically-minded voter. What's worse: it had already been extensively tried, and had not long been extinct by the time of Trump; indeed, the first Trump campaign was often credited with finally vanquishing what little remained of neoconservatism.
Finally, it had often been observed by Dissident theorists that many of America's troubles - and by extension, those of its client states - could be traced to certain grand lies, such as the tabula rasa view of human nature, or the whig view of history. To the extent that those in the Optics camp still shared the values and ideals of their compatriots, it would be necessary for them to deceive the public and any prospective policymakers they encountered about their true motives. If lies served to destroy the Republic, how then could they possibly be its salvation? This question was especially troubling for the many involved with the movement who professed Christianity, or rather, it should have been.
The true demise of the Optics line of thinking arrived in early 2021, however, not long after Trump's own loss of the Presidency. Ricky Vaughan, having had his identity revealed by the acrimonious and cynical editors of Huffington Post in 2018, was arrested on the accusation of 'depriving individuals of their right to vote' by 'spreading disinformation.’ Though the corrupt and insidious media and the government of the United States were alleging truly absurd claims, this event was noteworthy in that Vaughan had often claimed that his ideas represented the only path forward for the Right. Through his plans, Dissidents could avoid 'putting a target on their backs' and would elide problems with law enforcement, it was promised. Ricky was fond of pointing to the events that unfolded in Charlottesville a few years prior as evidence of the folly of his critics. Optics-enthusiasts asserted that the natural end of all who opposed them - extremists and wignats that they were - was to find themselves in highly-publicized court cases. Spencer - having faced exactly such legal woes in ample measure - was a frequent byword here.
With no political beachheads to speak of and diminishing returns on social media as a consequence of multiple, systematic ban waves by Google, Facebook, and Twitter, the Optics movement has lost much of its momentum, as has the remainder of the Dissident Right. A final blow arrived in 2022 when Nick Fuentes' America First organization began to splinter under the weight of numerous controversies surrounding its founder. Unfortunately, the damage has long been done.
Because of a fixation on 'looking good' that emerged out of Optics-based thinking, the entire movement is replete with pseudonymous personalities endlessly reproducing stale memes about 'alternative' nutrition advice, such as avoiding 'seed oils' and refusing to touch receipt paper. The concern for placating Boomers and Gen X rednecks has become so pervasive that most others simply spend their time (poorly) aping Larry the Cable Guy and Clint Eastwood while speaking on random, mundane subjects. Barely a trace of the novelty, idealism, and raw energy I remember from 2016 now exists. The movement is as sanitized and boring as network television, and this is the case on the best days.
There are many lessons to be learned from the trajectory of the Dissident Right here recalled, but I will end with one: a willingness to deceive others is simply not an asset. It is not a serious option for children, nor for businessmen, nor for lovers, and not for academics. Lying and misrepresenting one's self is - by definition - not constructive, and can never form the basis for rehabilitating or strengthening either people or the societies they are a part of. That this is true should not merit reiteration for grown adults; no cutting edge theory of theology, psychology or social philosophy can somehow countermand this simple truth we are given when we are young. It is my sincerest hope that somewhere in the future, all these words will prevent someone from repeating these shameful mistakes.
FINIS